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TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TELEMETRY MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-069.
2. (U) Meeting Date: November 29, 2009
Time: 11:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

3. (S) This was the first meeting to discuss telemetry provisions to be included in the START Follow-on treaty. The sides discussed the telemetry portion of a Russian package proposal and a U.S. revised telemetry proposal, each provided to the other side on November 28. Each side asked a series of questions to clarify the positions outlined in the proposals. While progress was made in understanding the positions of the two sides, it was agreed that they were not ready for technical level discussions at this point. It was clear there were many policy issues yet to be worked through in further discussions. End Summary.

4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Setting the Stage; Questioning the Russian Proposal; Questioning the U.S. Proposal; Clarifying Terms; and Closing Remarks.

SETTING THE STAGE

5. (S) Mr. Siemon thanked General Poznihir for scheduling a meeting on the topic of telemetry on such short notice. Poznihir welcomed the U.S. portion of the delegation and pointed out that there were a number of difficult questions to resolve. The Russian proposal was described as a package deal and a "final offer." He emphasized that the United States needed to respond to the package as a whole and that telemetry could not be separated out from the Russian package. Parity was a key provision and required the United States to address: 1) UK flight tests; 2) resolution of new type criteria; and 3) the relationship of telemetric information to missile defense. Poznihir and his colleagues had studied the U.S. proposal and believed it did not address the major Russian concerns but were willing to listen to the U.S. presentation.

6. (S) Siemon remarked that the United States played the same chess game and that put the sides in the position of turning proposals over on a daily basis. The latest U.S. proposal had been delivered the night before, after incorporating changes in response to the latest Russian package proposal, and was the result of work in Washington

over the last week. The U.S. proposal attempted to address the concepts discussed by Admiral Mullen and General Makarov early the previous week.

QUESTIONING THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL

17. (S) Siemon raised a number of questions to better

understand the telemetry portion of the Russian package proposal. He asked whether in the phrase "recording media of an agreed type," it was intended that playback equipment be included. It was clear from Poznihir's and Zaitsev's answers that Russia did not consider playback equipment in their proposal. Poznihir admitted that playback equipment probably was required but noted that it was not in the U.S. proposal either. He said that issue would be clarified later.

18. (S) Siemon asked how it was expected that encrypted data would be exchanged according to the Russian proposal. Poznihir replied that each Party had the right to encrypt or not encrypt whatever data it wanted but that there was an intention to exchange all data--the question was how the sides would provide access to each other's data.

19. (S) Siemon's third question concerned the number of flight tests for which the exemption from providing encrypted data would apply. There was some discussion of the number of flight tests implied in the Russian proposal as well as in the U.S. original and most recent proposals. The number intended in the Russian proposal was not fully clarified but it was stated that both sides would have the same number. The U.S. delegation raised the point that its understanding of the Russian proposal of 4 flight tests of each type to be exempted from data exchange, with 3 ICBMs and 4 SLBMs currently declared, would amount to 28 flight tests per year. The Russian view appeared to be that the actual number of flight tests would be negotiated. Poznihir also indicated that prototypes of new systems were a part of the Russian view of the flight test calculus. Zaitsev suggested that flight tests from UK submarines could be included in the calculus as well.

110. (S) Siemon remarked that the last two provisions in the Russian proposal were problematic for the United States. The first of these provisions would have the United States "undertake the obligation to provide telemetry information on...launches of Trident-II SLBMs from SSBNs of the United Kingdom." Siemon pointed out that the pattern of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom was a 45-year program and was discussed extensively in the development of the START Treaty. The United Kingdom is an independent sovereign nation with the right to its own weapons program and should not be a part of this treaty.

111. (S) The last provision in the Russian telemetry proposal was a call for a "unilateral statement on the non-use of telemetry information provided by Russia in the interest of missile defense." Siemon emphasized that their call for a unilateral statement could be considered but that it was yet another demand for U.S. assurances on a topic that should not be a part of a treaty that limits strategic offensive arms (SOA).

QUESTIONING THE U.S. PROPOSAL

112. (S) The Russian delegation then asked a series of questions to better understand the U.S. proposal. Poznihir asked what country produced the telemetry equipment for the UK Trident II missile tests. Coussa replied that the United States produced the telemetry system but it was used only on

the UK flight tests and was not integral to the missile system. Poznihir pointed out the Russian concern that the data could be accumulated and used by the United States if that were the case.

113. (S) Zaitsev remarked that the actual and simulated number of Trident RV dispensing procedures by the launchers on UK submarines had been observed to be as high as 12. This has been seen by high-level Russian officials as a way for the United States to get around the treaty. For that reason, they believed these flight tests should be notified and included under the treaty. Siemon replied that the United Kingdom has the right to possess and maintain its own independent deterrent force. The front section and warheads of the UK Trident are both designed and produced by the United Kingdom. The United States does not share its warheads with the United Kingdom or any other country--these are not flight tests covered under START nor would they be covered by START follow-on. Poznihir remarked that the Trident missile used a U.S.-produced guidance system. If the Trident missile could contain 12 warheads on the UK system, it could have that number on the U.S. version as well. He remarked that Russia was very concerned about this point and that he did not think telemetry provisions could be agreed without solving this issue.

14. (S) Siemon presented the main features of the U.S. proposal, emphasizing exchange of encrypted telemetry on test launches of ICBMs and SLBMs on the basis of parity, including: 1) the requirement to broadcast telemetry; 2) pre-notification of flight tests; 3) a ban on denial techniques; 4) exchange of recording media & advanced cryptovariable keys; and 5) exchange of interpretive data. The provisions associated with implementation of this approach include the following:

"The parties shall have the right to encrypt information for a specific number of test launches and will provide information to the other party on such test launches except for two ICBM test launches and two SLBM test launches each year. The specific elements associated with this agreement are:

-- A right to encrypt the telemetry of test launches using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-256, AES with 256 bit cryptovariables) unless the test launch is specified in advance as one of a launches for which information needed to decrypt the telemetry will not be provided.

-- Exchange of all information and parameters need to decrypt the AES standard used during the test launch.

-- Each missile test launch would use a unique cryptovariable, shared in advance between the two Parties.

-- Additional encryption details, to include encryption modes and parameters, will be determined through deliberations between technical representatives from both countries.

-- Sample data, both encrypted data and its associated unencrypted data, will be provided to assist in testing the validity of the encryption code and associated key.

-- A right to use any encryption standard for encrypting the telemetry of the limited number of test launches declared as exempt from the requirement to provide information and parameters to decrypt the telemetry data."

15. (S) Poznihir asked first how the U.S. proposal was meant to address or remove the expressed concerns of Russia and then what the U.S. side believed the fundamental difference was in the new U.S. proposal from START and the previous START Follow-on proposal. Siemon replied that the primary difference was the shift from the broadcast of unencrypted telemetry to the broadcast of encrypted telemetry in response to the concerns raised by Makarov regarding third Party (specifically Chinese and Japanese) access to unencrypted Russian telemetry. He clarified how encryption would work. There would be a difference between flight tests where data was shared and where encrypted data was not shared. All tests would be notified and those tests where all data would remain encrypted would be identified. For those tests where a side wanted full encryption and no sharing of unencrypted information, AES 256 with cryptovariable would not be required. For those tests in which data was exchanged, AES 256 would be used with the exchange of a unique cryptovariable used by both sides. This would enable the receiving Party to turn encrypted telemetry data into unencrypted data.

16. (S) Poznihir reiterated that Russia could not accept what appear to be START treaty approaches. There will not be limitations on throw-weight or number of reentry vehicles tested that would require telemetry for verification as there were under START. He expressed the concern that the U.S. side had not heard and understood the Russian concerns.

17. (S) Zaitsev asked what the United States saw as the differences between the U.S. and Russian proposals. Mr. Siemon replied that the U.S. proposal included more information describing the practical details of how the sides would implement encryption. He remarked that the U.S. side had heard the Russian position concerning the change in verification requirements but that continuing exchange of telemetry data was of value in START Follow-on for transparency reasons and for understanding the development programs of the other side to enhance strategic stability. While it was true that the sides would be going to lower numbers of warheads as a result of the treaty, they would also be building a new strategic relationship. Going from attribution to counting and inspecting actual warheads represents a fundamental change impossible to consider 20 years ago during the negotiation of START. It is important to exchange information on future developments in order to achieve strategic stability.

CLARIFYING TERMS

18. (S) Several more questions were broached to attempt to clarify the positions of the two sides. Trout asked about the flight test calculus of the Russian proposal to try to determine the maximum number of exempted flights. The U.S. proposal would allow 2 ICBM and 2 SLBM flights yielding a

maximum of 4 flight tests per year--by analogy, would the Russian proposal of 4 of each type mean the United States

could have 8 flights? Poznihir replied that he could envisage in some cases, such as the SS-25 flight tests this year, more than 4 of one type. He said he would not venture beyond the current Russian proposal. When asked by Trout what basis for equality Russia was looking for, Poznihir replied that the already-expressed elements of flight testing from UK submarines, exchange of telemetry on new types, and the relationship to missile defense constituted that basis.

CLOSING REMARKS

119. (S) Siemon and Poznihir both commented that the meeting had been useful in better understanding the positions of the two sides although they had not resolved the differences between them. Poznikhir did not believe the Russian side was ready for technical level discussions at this point, and it was premature to send a U.S. expert. He felt there were still too many policy issues to be worked through in further discussions. Both agreed to report on the discussions to their delegations and their respective capitals.

120. (U) Documents exchanged: None.

121. (S) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Siemon
Mr. Coussa
Ms. Pura
Mr. Trout
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Poznihir
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

122. (U) Gottenmoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS